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WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY I'M SORRY?
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S APOLOGY TO
GUATEMALA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
MARK GIBNEY & DR. DAVID WARNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
President Clinton's recent apology for the role of the United States
in supporting the Guatemalan military during Guatemala's brutal civil
war should have enormous consequences for both international and
domestic law. In large part responding to the findings of an independ-
ent Guatemalan truth commission,' Clinton was unequivocal in his
condemnation of U.S. policy during Guatemala's decades-long conflict
that cost upwards of 200,000 civilian lives:
For the United States, it is important that I state clearly that support
for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and
widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not re-
peat that mistake. We must, and we will, instead, continue to support
the peace and reconciliation process in Guatemala.
2
At a press conference at the end of the summit, Clinton reiterated
the apology in the following manner.
[Wihat I apologized for has nothing to do with the fact that there was a
difference between the policy of the administration and the Congress in
previous years, going back for decades, and including administrations
of both parties. It is that the policy of the Executive Branch was
wrong. And what we're doing here is in the open, it's not a secret .
. Professor Mark Gibney, Belk Distinguished Professor of Humanities, University
of North Caroline at Asheville. N.C. Dr. David Warner, Deputy to the Director for Exter-
nal Relations and Special Programs, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.
1. Mireya Navarro, Guatemala Study Accuses the Army and Cites U.S. Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al.
2. Remarks by the President in Roundtable Discussion on Peace Efforts, National
Palace of Culture, Guatemala City, Guatemala, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 395 (March
10, 1999).
3. Remarks by the President at Signing Ceremony and Summit Closing Statements,
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This comment begins with the notion of state responsibility across
borders, and asks what effect, if any, the Clinton apology might have to
that end in international law. This comment then examines United
States domestic law to see how President Clinton's admission of wrong-
doing might effect potential claims that could be brought by Guatema-
lans in U.S. courts.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Transnational State Responsibility'
Since World War II, there have been enormous changes in the no-
tion of "state sovereignty." Prior to this time, events taking place
within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular state - no matter how
gruesome these policies and practices happened to be - were seen and
treated as mainly "internal affairs". After World War II, this particu-
larly limited conception of state sovereignty has evolved, and we now
hold states responsible for violations of international law that they have
committed, at least theoretically. This responsibility is notwithstand-
ing the fact that the violations have occurred solely within the territo-
rial boundaries of the state.
State sovereignty still serves to protect against many forms of state
responsibility. However, now it is far more likely that countries will in-
voke the sovereignty of another state in order to remove themselves
from any and all responsibility for causing an act or for assisting an
outlaw state.5 For example, a state that provides security and military
aid to a country that engages in human rights violations may argue
that it is not violating international law because it never actually "pulls
the trigger". To put this another way, the state that provides the aid
maintains that it cannot be held responsible for the actions of the re-
ceiving state.
This extremely limited notion of transnational state responsibility
is evident in the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) decision in Nica-
ragua v United States, as well as in the work of the International Law
Commission.
The Nicaragua case addressed two forms of transnational state re-
sponsibility. The first was whether the United States was responsible
Casa Santo Domingo, Convention Center, Antigua, Guatemala, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC 403 (March 11, 1999).
4. Although transnational usually refers to non-state activities, this note will use it
to refer to relations between States as well.
5. See generally, Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State Responsibility for Viola-
tions of Human Rights, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267 (1999).
6. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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for its own actions in Nicaragua that contravened international law,
and the second was whether the United States was responsible for the
contra rebels' acts. The ICJ readily answered the first question in the
affirmative.7 As to the second question, the ICJ refused to hold the U.S.
government responsible for violations committed by the contra rebel
forces, a paramilitary group that had received substantial support from
the United States. In terms of responsibility, the Court focused on the
question of "control" and arrived at the following conclusion: "In light of
the evidence and material available to it, the Court is not satisfied that
all the operations launched by the contra force, at every stage of the
conflict, reflected strategy and tactics wholly devised by the United
States."s
The Nicaragua case seems to set the bar so high concerning opera-
tional control that it is nearly impossible to imagine a situation where a
state that provides military and security assistance to another state, or
to an entity such as a guerrilla force, would be held legally responsible
for the manner in which such aid was used.
The International Law Commission takes a slightly different ap-
proach, but the results are similar. Article 27 of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility entitled "Aid or assistance by a State to another
State for the commission of an internationally wrongful act" reads:
Aid or assistance by a State to another State, if it is established that it
is rendered for the commission of an internationally wrongful act, car-
ried out by the latter, itself constitutes an internationally wrongful act,
even if, taken alone, such aid or assistance would not constitute the
breach of an international obligation.9
In the commentary accompanying the article, the authors stress
that in order for there to be legal responsibility for aiding or assisting
another state, the sending state must intend that the receiving state
engage in internationally wrongful conduct.
[Ilt is not sufficient that aid or assistance provided without such inten-
7. The International Court of Justice held that the United States breached a num-
ber of customary international law obligations. Among these violations were the follow-
ing: By training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra rebel forces the
United States had violated the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of another state.
Through its actions in armed attacks at various locations in Nicaragua, the U.S. had
breached its obligation not to use force against another State. And in laying mines in the
internal or territorial waters of Nicaragua, the United States was in breach of its obliga-
tions under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to in-
tervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime
commerce. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 194.
8. Id. 1 106 (emphases added).
9. Report of the International Law Commission on its Thirtieth Session [19781 V.11,
pt. 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 99.
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tion could be used by the recipient State for unlawful purposes, or that
the State providing aid or assistance should be aware of the eventual
possibility of such use. The aid or assistance must in fact be rendered
with a view to its use in committing the principal internationally
wrongful act. Nor is it sufficient that this intention be "presumed," as
the article emphasizes, it must be "established."0
In sum, the status of transnational state responsibility as it pres-
ently stands requires that a state that provides aid and assistance to
another state must exercise almost complete control over the receiving
state in order to be held responsible for any human rights violations
carried out by the second state. Under the changes proposed by the In-
ternational Law Commission, the law would only change slightly, with
state responsibility arising when the sending state intends that the re-
ceiving state will use this assistance in order to carry out internation-
ally wrongful acts.
B. President Clinton's Apology and International Law
Notwithstanding the very close that existed relationship between
the United States and the various military dictatorships in Guate-
mala," the U.S. was seemingly not in violation of international law - at
least as it stands at present. This is because there is no indication that
the U.S. government exercised anywhere near the level of "control" over
the Guatemalan government seemingly demanded by the ICJ in the
Nicaragua case. Similarly, notwithstanding the egregious human
rights record of the Guatemalan government and its military, there is
absolutely no indication that the intent behind the practice of providing
military and security assistance was such that Guatemala would use
this material to commit internationally wrongful acts.
Still, the President's statement that the policy of the United States
was "wrong" is an unequivocal condemnation of actions taken by the
U.S. government in the past. This begs the question, what effect does
the apology have under international law?
In the Nuclear Tests Judgment, the ICJ held that declaratory
statements by Government officials can have the force of legal obliga-
tion.12 In addition, it is well recognized that declarations made by way
of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the
effect of creating legal obligations: "When it is the intention of the State
making the declaration that it should become bound according to its
terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal
10. Id. at 104.
11. See Susanne Jonas, Dangerous Liaisons: The U.S. in Guatemala, FOREIGN POLVY
144 (1996).
12. Nuclear Test Cases (Australia vs. France), 1974 I.C.J., 253 1 43.
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undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a
course of conduct consistent with the declaration." 3
It is clear from the President's statement that he is speaking for
the United States, as opposed to speaking in a personal capacity. His
apology about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, for example, was
obviously a personal statement." On the other hand, his apology for the
syphilis study done in Tuskegee was clearly an apology for past Gov-
ernmental actions with specific future steps outlined by the Govern-
ment.5 Both the apologies for the Tuskegee incident and the United
States' actions in Guatemala were policy statements.
What is not so clear in the Guatemala apology, however, is whether
or not he considers his statement to have a binding effect, creating a le-
gal obligation on the United States, or whether the statement is some
kind of moral pronouncement. Our reading of the President's statement
is that the apology was intended to have both legal and moral implica-
tions. The moral implications of the mea culpa are self-evident and
need no further discussion. But there wouldn't be any moral implica-
tions if there was no force of law behind them. Otherwise, the Presi-
dent could simply declare U.S. actions "wrong", but then continue to
carry out these very same actions without any concern with the legal
implications of doing so. This would not only be a very strained (and
strange) version of morality, but it would constitute a very odd concep-
tion of law as well.16 The very purpose of the President's statement
must be more than just a personal or national apology; there is more go-
ing on here. Simply because he stated moral responsibility does not
void the apology of legal consequences.
Assuming, then, that President Clinton truly intended to issue a
serious apology, several questions remain about the implications of the
apology. One is specific to Guatemala. If U.S. policy constituted a vio-
lation of international law, is a mere apology sufficient? What kinds of
13. Id.
14. See e.g. Dan Balz & Guy Gugliotta, Even Critics Are Cautious in Wake of Presi-
dent's Speech, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1999, at A12.
15. See Remarks by the President in Apology for Study Done in Tuskegee, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 719 (May 16, 1997).
(A)nd finally say on behalf of the American people, what the United States
government did was shameful, and I am sorry... The legacy of the study at
Tuskegee has reached far and deep, in ways that hurt our progress and di-
vide our nation. We cannot be one American when a whole segment of our
nation has no trust in America. An apology is the first step, and we take it
with a commitment to rebuild that broken trust. We can begin by making
sure that there is never again another episode like this one.. .Today I would
like to announce several steps to help us achieve those goals." \
Id.
16. On the relationship between moral and law in terms of responsibility, see gener-
ally DANIEL WARNER, AN ETHIc OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 61-81
(1991).
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obligations does the apology entail? Another question is where else in
the world is an apology (or more) by the United States warranted? The
President's apology was for past U.S. policy decisions, but are there
analogous practices in any other countries at present? And how will
this change the conduct of American foreign policy in the future? Apart
from the United States, will the President's apology have any influence
upon the practices of any other state for purposes of establishing cus-
tomary international law concerning the recognition of aiding and as-
sisting a wrongdoer? And finally, what will the President's apology
mean in terms of the recent development of transnational state respon-
sibility more generally?
III. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
In addition to its importance for international law, President Clin-
ton's apology also has enormous implications in terms of U.S. domestic
law. In particular, the admission of wrongdoing should play a key, and
likely dispositive, role in lawsuits attempting to hold the U.S. govern-
ment liable for its actions in Guatemala. What weighs against this li-
ability, of course, is the lack of real success foreign nationals have had
in United States courts on human rights issues. Notwithstanding the
apparent willingness of the American judiciary to hear suits brought by
foreign nationals against other foreign nationals for human rights
abuses occurring in other countries,17 many of these same courts have
readily dismissed such suits brought by foreign nationals alleging hu-
man rights abuses by the U.S. government and top ranking government
officials. 18 Whether alleging direct or indirect harm, the results have all
been the same. The U.S. has shown a strong domestic tendency to re-
duce state immunity and the Act of State doctrine when agents of for-
eign governments or, in some cases, foreign governments themselves,
are brought before U.S. Courts on the basis that they have violated in-
ternational human rights law. However, these same courts still give
absolute import to the Act of State doctrine when an act of the U.S. gov-
ernment is in question. The question we raise is the extent to which the
President's admission of wrongdoing in Guatemala will change the law
in this area.
17. The line of cases that have been developed are generally known as Filartiga
cases, named after the case that first enunciated this principle, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Jurisdiction in these cases is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
a statute passed by the very first Congress in 1789. "The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789). See also BETH STEPHENS
& MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 20-24
(1996).
18. See generally, Mark Gibney, U.S. Courts and the Selectiue Protection of Human
Rights, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? (Mark Gibney &
Stanislaw Frankowski eds., 1999).
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A Avoiding State Liability in United States Courts
One of the first cases that sought to hold the United States respon-
sible for the human consequences of American foreign policy was San-
chez-Espinoza v. Reagan.19 In this case there were three groups of
plaintiffs: twelve Nicaraguan civilians, twelve members of the U.S.
House of Representatives, and two residents of the state of Florida. The
Nicaraguan civilians based their suit on allegations that the United
States was providing support for the contra rebels who, in turn, were
committing terrorist activities in Nicaragua. Despite recognizing the
"gravity and complexity of the plaintiffs' claims,"20 the district court dis-
missed the case on the basis of the political question doctrine. The
court stated, "[in order to adjudicate the tort claims of the Nicaraguan
plaintiffs, we would have to determine the precise nature of the United
States government's involvement in the affairs of several Central
American nations, namely, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador and
Nicaragua."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal, but on
the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In the words of then-
Judge Scalia, "[ilt would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity if federal courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin, by
judgments nominally against present or former Executive officers, ac-
tions that are, concededly and as a jurisdictional necessity, official ac-
tions of the United States."2
Notwithstanding the protections of sovereign immunity, Judge
Scalia suggested that the plaintiffs might receive some compensation.
However, in his view, any relief would have to come from the political
branches and not from the judiciary.
Saltany v. Reagan' was a suit brought by a group of fifty-three
Libyan plaintiffs (all civilians), who sued for personal and property
damage from the U.S. military air strikes in April, 1986. The U.S. air
strikes were in retaliation for the alleged Libyan bombing of a disco in
West Berlin earlier that month that had killed two American service-
men. The district court readily conceded that the conduct would have
been "tortuous" if it were judged by civil law standards. However, the
court did not employ any legal standards. Instead, it justified dismissal
of the case on the basis that the defendants had exercised "discretion in
a myriad of contexts of utmost complexity and gravity, not to mention
19. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983) afrd, 770 F. 2d 202
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
20. Id. at 601.
21. Id.
22. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F. 2d at 207 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
23. Saltany v. Reagan, 707 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988).
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danger." 24 And in a manner just as curious, the district court further
noted that the defendants had "acted, as duty required, in accordance
with the orders of the commander-in-chief or a superior order."2 Ap-
parently, based on the reasoning that the operation involved great com-
plexity and danger, and that it was carried out through the govern-
ment's chain of command, the district court held that the defendants
were immune from suit.
What was obviously irksome to the court was the mere fact that the
suit was brought in the first place. Taking particular aim at the plain-
tiffs' attorney, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, the court
described the case as "audacious."2 , Yet, in its haste to dismiss this au-
dacious lawsuit, the court overlooked several things. First, there was,
and continues to be, serious dispute as to whether the Libyan govern-
ment was behind the West Berlin bombing. That is, Libyan civilians
were killed based on evidence that many of our allies questioned. Sec-
ond, the retaliatory raids violated international law. Article 25 of the
Hague Regulations of 1907 states: "The attack or bombardment, by
whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are
undefended, is prohibited."2 Third, the court never explained why the
lawsuit - based on harm to innocent civilians - was not warranted.
The December, 1989 invasion of Panama brought about the deaths
of between 200 and 2000 civilians. Yet, all attempts to seek compensa-
tion have so far proven unsuccessful. In McFarland v. Cheney,2 a law-
suit was brought on behalf of a group of Panamanian civilians who suf-
fered personal injury, property loss and the death of loved ones during
the American invasion. It is interesting to note that many of the
petitioners in the case had filed administrative service claims with the
U.S. Army Claims Service seeking compensation for their losses and
injuries, attempting to rely upon a precedent used to compensate
civilians harmed in the 1983 invasion of Grenada.' However, the Army
Claims Service rejected all of the Panamanian compensation claims on
the ground that the various injuries occurred during U.S. combat opera-
tions (although this was true in Grenada as well). The district court
upheld this administrative finding and the judgment was affirmed on
appeal. While the Panamanian government has received assistance
from the United States, none of these funds have been set aside for the
victims of the invasion.
24. Id. at 322.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Annex to the Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Art. 25, Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS No. 539, 205 Parry's TS 277.
28. McFarland v. Cheney, 1991 WL 43262 (D.D.C. 1991) afrd, 971 F. 2d 766 (D.C.Cir.
1992) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1053 (1993).
29. Jeffrey Harris, Grenada - A Claims Perspective, 1986 ARMY LAW. 7.
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Finally, the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 over the Persian Gulf by
missile fire from the U.S.S. Vincennes, killing all of the passengers and
crew aboard, has also been the subject of litigation in the United States.
In Nejad v. United States,"' the plaintiffs were the families and eco-
nomic dependents of four passengers. The defendants were the U.S.
government and twelve defense contractors that had supplied the ship
with military equipment. The district court quickly and easily dis-
missed the plaintiffs' case, evincing complete deference to the political
branches (as well as spurious reasoning) that has seemingly become the
norm in this area. "It is indubitably clear that the plaintiffs' claim calls
into question the Navy's decisions and actions in execution of those de-
cisions. The conduct of such affairs are [sic] constitutionally committed
to the President as Commander in Chief and to his military and naval
subordinates."3'
Koohi v. United States' was based upon the same set of facts, and
the disposition of the case - dismissal - was predictable enough. There
are, however, a number of noteworthy (and disturbing) aspects of this
case on appeal. The most noteworthy is that the court went out of its
way to hold that the case was justiciable.33 The defendants had tried to
argue for dismissal on the basis of the political question doctrine, but
the court held that government operations are traditional subjects of
damage actions.' Furthermore, the court held that the judiciary is "ca-
pable of reviewing military decisions, particularly when those decisions
cause injury to civilians." Finally, the court took note of the fact that
the plaintiffs were merely seeking money damages, and not any form of
injunctive relief, which might prove to be far more intrusive into ongo-
ing government operations.
Yet, despite all this, the court then upheld dismissal of the case on
the basis of the Federal Tort Claims Act,' which makes an exception to
the waiver of sovereign immunity for "[a]ny claim arising out of com-
batant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard,
during time of war."37 Notwithstanding the fact that there had been no
declaration of war, and although the events in question had long pre-
ceded what eventually came to be the Persian Gulf War, the court felt
30. Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
31. Id. at 755.
32. Koohi v. United States, 967 F. 2d 1328 (9' Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928
(1993).
33. Id. at 1331.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 28. U.S.C. § 1346(b). The Federal Tort Claims Act gives jurisdiction to federal
district courts for claims against the United States for personal injury or death caused by
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of any employee of the government while acting
within the scope of his or her office or employment.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (j).
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that there were important policy considerations for maintaining sover-
eign immunity. More specifically, the court held that tort liability is
based on the theory that the prospect of liability makes an actor more
careful. However, in the court's view, Congress did not want U.S. ser-
vice personnel to exercise great caution "when bold and imaginative
measures might be necessary to overcome enemy forces.' And, in the
most extreme language to be found in any of these cases protecting
against liability of the U.S. government, the court held that "the result
would be no different if the downing of the civilian plane had been de-
liberative rather than the result of error.
3 9
B. The Apology and Domestic Law
What effect, if any, will President Clinton's apology have in terms
of domestic law, particularly with respect to claims that might be
brought by Guatemalan civilians? Notwithstanding the enormous de-
gree of judicial deference exhibited above, it is difficult to believe that
the apology will not have any legal effect. After all, to use a criminal
law analogy, the apology is similar to an admission of guilt. How, then,
could domestic courts deny relief to Guatemalans after the President of
the United States has publicly admitted that the American policy in
Guatemala was "wrong?"'
Other questions remain. What about situations where U.S. policy
was similar to the Guatemalan policy - longstanding support for a gov-
ernment that carried out gross and systematic human rights abuses
against its civilian population - but where no Presidential apology has
been forthcoming? How should the American judiciary (or Congress, for
that matter) respond to these kinds of situations, particularly now that
the fighting in a number of countries has ended? In other words, wha'
is the difference between an admission of wrongdoing and actual
wrongdoing?
38. Koohi, 967 F.2d. at 1334-35.
39. Id. at 1335.
40. Remarks by the President in Roundtable Discussion on Peace Efforts, supra note
2 (emphasis added). But never underestimate the deference of the American judiciary in
matters pertaining to foreign affairs. In justifying dismissal of the plaintiffs' case in
Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, the District Court
for the District of Columbia indicated the level of abuse it might take to involve the judi-
ciary: If Congress adopted a foreign policy that resulted in the enslavement of our citizens
or of other individuals, that policy might well be subject to challenge in domestic court
under international law. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F. 2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the collective shrug that it has been met with so far,4'
President Clinton's apology for the role played by the U.S. in Guate-
mala's civil war should not be viewed as mere political rhetoric. Nor
should the apology be treated as a theoretical issue in terms of law.
Rather, the President is publicly admitting that the government that he
represents was complicit in the brutal practices of another government.
From the perspective of international law, this apology should serve to
substantially change the manner in which transnational state responsi-
bility has been treated. No longer should a government be able to ab-
solve itself from responsibility and liability merely because it was not
the entity that ultimately "pulled the trigger."
What the Clinton apology does is to lower the bar of responsibility
established in the Nicaragua case. The actions of the United States
were wrong not because the U.S. was somehow able to "control" the ac-
tions of the Guatemalan government, nor because it provided aid and
assistance with the "intent" that the Guatemalan government would
use it to commit internationally wrongful acts. Instead, the actions of
the U.S. government were wrong, and presumably illegal, simply be-
cause the U.S. was aware of the gross and systematic human rights
abuses that were being carried out in Guatemala, yet the U.S. persisted
in supporting this government.
Similarly, President Clinton's apology should also have enormous
consequences in terms of domestic law. U.S. courts have rushed to offer
a wild assortment of defenses whenever foreign plaintiffs have sought
compensation for the human consequences of American foreign policy.
Most of those defenses have given tremendous deference to executive
policy. But it remains to be seen whether the judiciary can continue to
deny justice now that the President has publicly admitted wrongdoing
for helping and abetting Guatemalan military and intelligence forces
engaged in widespread repression.
41. For example, the New York Times carried the story on page 12, see John M.
Broder, Clinton Apologizes for U.S. Support for Guatemalan Rightists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 1999, at A12.
2000

